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1. Introduction
On October 25, 1993, in the Los Angeles courtroom of Superior
Court Judge John W. Ouderkirk, something unusual occured: a juror
and an alternate juror each read prepared statements to the press de-
fending and attacking, respectively, the verdicts they had handed
down in a recently concluded criminal case.1 The media had been
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. A.B., 1980,
Stanford University; J.D., 1984, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall). I wish to thank Gerald Bennett, Wendy Fitzgerald, Tracey Maclin and Michael Sei-
gel for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful to James Ezeilo,
Douglas Harrison and Kent Showalter for their research assistance. I would also like to
thank Dean Jeffrey Lewis and the University of Florida College of Law for research
support.
1. Seth Mydans, Leader Denies Bias or Fear on Riot Jury, N.Y. Trmms, Oct. 26, 1993,
at A16.
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hastily assembled in the courtroom at the behest of the jurors them-
selves, who felt obligated to respond to questions raised about the ver-
dicts they had rendered one week earlier.2 Not only is it unusual for
jurors to communicate with the media via press release in such a for-
mal setting, it is also unusual for jurors to initiate such contact them-
selves. These, however, were no ordinary jurors. These were the
jurors in the case of People v. Williams,3 better known as the Reginald
Denny beating case.4
Traditionally, the province of the jury was too highly respected to
permit the press to intrude with questions and requests for interviews.
The jury, with its responsibility to sift through the evidence impar-
tially, was sacrosanct.5  The increasing media saturation of society,
however, has led to a greater demand for jurors in cases which draw
significant media coverage to defend and explain their verdicts
through the avenues of mass communication. This phenomenon has
been observed in many recent high-profile cases, such as the federal
and state Rodney King prosecutions, 7 the Lorena Bobbitt trial,8 the
2. See id.
3. Cal. Super. Ct. for L.A. Cty. No. BA-058116. These jurors heard the charges
against Damian Williams and Henry Keith Watson. Two other defendants, Antoine Miller
and Gary Williams resolved their cases through plea negotiations. Seth Mydans, Acquittal
and Deadlock End the Trial of 2 In Riot Beating, N.Y. TuMEs, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al (Gary
Williams sentenced to three-year term for grand theft and assault); Man Gets Probation in
1992 Riot Shooting, N.Y. TimEs, July 11, 1994, at B7 (Antoine Miller placed on probation).
4. Strangely enough, at the conclusion of the jury's press conference, the judge an-
nounced that several jurors would be appearing on a number of "newsmagazine" shows to
discuss their verdicts. This caused a tumultuous scene, as other media representatives
scrambled to present their credentials to the jurors so that they might obtain interviews as
well. Mydans, supra note 1.
5. See David Margolick, Juries Lose a Lofty Aura in Glare of Instant Fame, N.Y.
T iEs, Oct. 22, 1993, at A18.
6. Robert L. Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror's Identity. To-
ward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury's Deliberative Process, 17 PnPp. L. REv. 357, 358
(1990) (Due to the frequency with which juror comments are reported, "one might reason-
ably hypothesize that the public anticipates a report of juror's comments in well-publicized
cases."). Other authors have written about the increasing prevalence of post-trial media
interviews with jurors. While these analyses typically explore conflicts that may arise be-
tween the media's right of access and the defendant's right to a fair trial or a juror's right to
privacy, they do not consider the effect of post-trial interviews on societal conceptions of
the appropriate role of the jury within the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Abraham S.
Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. ILL.
L. REV. 295; Raskopf, supra; Eileen F. Tanielian, Battle of the Privileges: First Amendment
vs. Sixth Amendment, 10 Loy. Err. L. J. 215 (1990). For a thoughtful article that does
consider the systemic consequences of post-verdict juror interviews, but is somewhat
dated, see Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Lee A. Daniels, Some of the Jurors Speak, Giving Sharply Differing
Views, N.Y. TIM-s, May 1, 1992, at A10 (state Rodney King prosecution); Jurors Criticize
Beating Sentences, N.Y. Tnvms, Aug. 9, 1993, at All (federal Rodney King prosecution).
Menendez brothers trial,9 the McMartin Preschool prosecution, 10 and
the trial of John DeLorean.11 One can reasonably anticipate that the
jurors serving in the pending trial of O.J. Simpson"2 will receive an
unprecedented barrage of requests for interviews, notwithstanding a
recently passed California law preventing such interviews for a period
of 90 days. 3
The Reginald Denny beating trial was one of the most publicized
criminal cases in recent memory." Indeed, the violent acts the de-
fendants were accused of committing had been televised for all to see.
Television audiences observed the horrible spectacle of truck driver
Reginald Denny being dragged from his cab, kicked and beaten, then
struck in the head by a forcefully thrown brick.15 The beating of Regi-
nald Denny, like the similarly televised beating of Rodney King, as-
sumed substantial symbolic importance. 6 The Reginald Denny case
8. See, e.g., Bobbitt Jurors Recount Case, N.Y. TvIES, Jan. 23, 1994, at A20.
9. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Menendez Lawyer Enlists Sympathetic Jurors to Defend
Client, N.Y. TAnvs, Feb. 1, 1994, at A10. Several jurors from the Lyle Menendez trial also
appeared on the Maury Povitch Show.
10. See, e.g., Robert Reinhold, 2 Acquitted of Child Molestation in Nation's Longest
Criminal Trial, N.Y. Trams, Jan. 19, 1990, at Al.
11. See, e.g., Inside the DeLorean Jury Room, THE AmERiCAN LAWYER, Dec. 1984, at
1.
12. The trial of actor and former footbal great OJ. Simpson for the murder of his
estranged wife and her male friend has garnered more publicity than any other criminal
trial in history. See Bill Carter, Networks' Simpson Vigil" A Low-Cost Reply to CNN, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 11, 1994, at Dl. As this article goes to press, the trial's daily proceedings are
being telecast live to huge national audiences. Id.
13. See infra note 158.
14. See William A. Schroeder, A No-Fault System of Justice?, ST. Louis Posr-Dis-
PATCH, Feb. 23, 1994, at 7B (reviewing outcomes of several highly publicized recent trials,
including the Reginald Denny trial).
15. Denny had the misfortune to drive his truck into the intersection of Florence and
Normandie Streets, where public protest against the verdicts rendered in the Rodney King
case quickly degenerated into chaos. Denny and several other white and Latino motorists
were assaulted as they attempted to pass through the intersection. A news helicopter hov-
ering above recorded the assaults. Mydans, supra note 3. The assault on Denny was one of
the most vicious. According to evidence submitted at trial, Denny suffered more than 90
skull fractures. Seth Mydans, One Jury's Journey; Amid Case's Facts and a City's Fears,
Seeking Rationale for Jurors' Findings, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1993, at A16.
16. As a story in Tune noted:
The actions of police and prosecutors helped weight the trial with symbolism.
The uncommon spectacle of Williams being arrested at home, in front of TV cam-
eras, by no less a figure than police chief Daryl Gates, strengthened the case of
those who said the accused were being made scapegoats for the entire riot. When
Williams and Watson, along with co-defendants Antoine Miller and Gary Wil-
liams, were booked on high bail-$580,000 for Williams alone-it added power to
that argument.
Richard Lacayo, A Slap for a Broken Head, TIME, Nov. 1, 1993, at 46.
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attracted great public interest in part because it reversed the racial
symbolism of the Rodney King beating. Rodney King, a black motor-
ist, had been beaten by white officers. In the Denny case, the victim
of the televised beating was white, while the perpetrators were black.
Interest in the case only intensified after the jury returned verdicts
acquitting the first two defendants to be tried, Damian Williams and
Henry Keith Watson, of the most serious charges. 17
Many parallels may be drawn between the Rodney King and the
Reginald Denny trials.18 The jury that heard the case against Williams
and Watson, however, cannot be subjected to the same criticism that
ultimately tarnished the first Rodney King verdict. That verdict was
attacked as unfair because it was rendered by a jury with few and
marginalized racial minorities.19 In the Denny case, the jury was more
representative of the multi-ethnic character of the Los Angeles area.
Ultimately, four African-Americans, four Latinos, two Whites, and
two Asian-Americans were seated on the Reginald Denny jury.20
The racial diversity of the jury, however, was not enough to give
the Reginald Denny verdicts legitimacy. Many thought that the ver-
dicts may have been influenced by external considerations, chiefly the
concern that guilty verdicts might ignite more public disturbances of
the sort that followed the first Rodney King verdict.21 Others won-
dered whether the jurors decided to be lenient out of fear for their
own personal safety.2' Still others believed the verdicts were an at-
17. See Mydans, supra note 15.
18. Among other things, both were racially polarized trials involving televised beatings
and interracial crimes. In addition, both trials took place in a large media market-Los
Angeles-and generated great publicity, before, during and after the trial. See Bill Boyar-
sky, The Underlying Tensions In the Denny Case, L.A. Tmfms, Mar. 24, 1993, at B2; Jim
Newton, L.A. Trials Show "Blind Justice" Is Hard to Achieve, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at
Al; Jim Newton, Defense in Denny Beating Parallels King Case, L.A. Tafms, May 16, 1992,
at Bi.
19. Only one Latino and one Asian served on the Rodney King jury. Some felt this
sparse minority presence undermined the appearance of justice. Others went further and
argued that the verdict itself was the result of racist sentiment on the part of the majority
jurors which could have been prevented if blacks or more people of color had been seated
on the jury. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Per-
emptory Challenge, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63 (1993).
20. Seth Mydans, Judge Voids Verdicts and Drops 2d Juror in Riot Assault Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al. Originally a jury consisting of three whites, four blacks, four
latinos, and one asian was selected to hear the trial. The racial composition of the jury,
however, changed as jurors were removed from the case and replaced with alternates. See
id.
21. See Edward J. Boyer, Juror Says Evidence, Not Fear of Riots, Led to Verdicts, L.A.
Tmms, Oct. 22, 1993, at B1.
22. See Mydans, supra note 15; Seth Mydans, Juror in Denny Case Recounts Stress and
Obsession with Detail, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1993, at A18.
tempt to teach the Los Angeles Prosecutor's office a lesson for
overcharging the case in the first place.' In addition, some speculated
whether the verdicts were a perverse form of racial revenge for the
Rodney King verdict-facilitated by the presence of African-Ameri-
can jurors?- 4 As a result, the jury took the extraordinary step of
launching, beginning with their in-court press conference.25 what
amounted to a public relations campaign to convince the public of the
correctness of their verdicts. 6
The circumstances surrounding the Reginald Denny trial demon-
strate a substantial shift in the way the jury is perceived. In the past,
the presence of a cross section of the community on the jury was suffi-
cient for the verdict to be accepted as fair. Now, however, it appears
that simple demographic representativeness is not enough to insure
that jury verdicts will be accepted as legitimate. A new form of repre-
sentativeness is required; juries not only must be representative of
their communities, they must also be able to represent their verdicts to
their communities. In high-profile cases, juries have the additional
23. This explanation may have been at least partially true. At least one juror verified
that she thought the prosecution had overcharged the case. Mydans, supra note 15.
24. See Crime Without Punishment, NATiONAL Rnvmw, Nov. 15, 1993, at 14
(editorial).
25. The statement read at the press conference by the jury foreperson on behalf of the
entire twelve person jury addressed the many concerns raised about the propriety of the
verdicts. See Boyer, supra note 21. The statement read as follows:
There has been a lot of expressed anger, shock, disbelief and speculation regard-
ing the verdicts. The verdicts were decided according to the law, not through
intimidation, fear of another riot, nor were the verdicts based on black versus
white. The verdicts were based on the evidence and facts presented in court. We
followed the judge's instructions and all 12 of us understood the law as presented
to us. We feel the verdicts rendered were within the confines of the law, not due
to any outside influences or considerations. We do not condone what happened
at Florence and Normandie. However, we the jury feel confident that we did the
best job possible given the evidence and the applicable law.
Id.
26. Shortly after their press conference, a total of eighteen jurors and alternates ap-
peared on the NBC newsmagazine show, Now. Both individual and group interviews were
conducted with jurors on camera. The group interviews took place with the jurors ar-
ranged in a faux jury box. The lighting was arranged so that those jurors and alternates
that wished to remain anonymous were shown in shadow. Now, (NBC Television Broad-
cast 1993) Cf. United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 864, 865 (D. Md. 1961), where an hour-
long recreation of the jury deliberations in a rape and murder trial, featuring the participa-
tion of nine jurors, was found to "interfere with the orderly processes of justice." In addi-
tion, the jury forewoman from the Denny trial gave an interview to Time Magazine; See
Elizabeth Gleick, The Head of the Denny Jury Tells What Happened Before; The Verdict,
TImE, Nov. 8, 1993, at 87. Also the alternate juror who initially criticized the verdicts
appeared on the Larry King Show. See Larry King Show (CNN Television Broadcast, Oct.
26, 1993).
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duty of explaining and defending their verdicts, a responsibility that
juries in routine cases do not have to bear.
The development of this new representative function does not
merely create additional responsibilities for jurors. The jury's new
role as the emissary of the criminal justice system to society has the
ability to fundamentally transform the jury's institutional character.
Ascribing a new representative function to the jury raises several criti-
cal questions. For example, what effect does requiring the jury to de-
fend its verdict to the public have on the jury's fact-finding function,
or on the legitimacy or respect afforded to its verdicts? How might
the prospect of intense publicity affect the type of people who might
be willing to serve on a jury, or perceptions of who might be compe-
tent to serve on a jury? And, finally, what impact would requiring
juries to explain their verdicts to the public have on the fairness of the
trial?
This article explores these and other questions related to the
emergence of the jury's new representative function. Section II exam-
ines traditional notions of jury representativeness by demonstrating
how the jury came to be viewed as a means of providing community
input into the criminal justice process. Section II also describes how a
broadly representative jury can aid in fact-finding and provide legiti-
macy for the verdict. Finally, section II explains how a jury system,
closed to public exploitation, was traditionally seen as a way to protect
the jury's ability to reach independent judgments.
Section III reviews selected cases which reveal judicial recogni-
tion of the jury's new representative function and determines that ef-
forts to facilitate greater communication between the public and
jurors should be favored by the courts. Section IV evaluates how the
jury's ability to perform its traditional fact-finding and legitimating
functions is affected by the practice of encouraging jurors to explain
their verdicts to the broader community. This article concludes that
while the jury's new representative function may serve valuable edu-
cational ends and enhance the legitimacy of jury verdicts, it does so at
the expense of the jury's fact-finding ability.
H. Traditional Views of Jury Representativeness
When the institution of the jury was in its infancy, the identity of
those called to serve as jurors was widely known. In medieval Eng-
land, a person accused of a crime was often required to produce a
certain number of supporters from the community where the crime
took place, who would swear to the truthfulness of the defendant's
version of events.27 The supporters, or compurgators, had a sacred
duty to "accuse no innocent person [nor] conceal a guilty one."8 The
defendant was found not guilty and released if all compurgators swore
to the innocence of the accused.29
Trial by compurgation was a less than ideal fact-finding process.30
Substantial evidence suggests that compurgators took their oaths less
than seriously.31 In fact, one historian of the period stated that
"[p]erjury was the dominant crime of the Middle Ages, encouraged by
the preposterous rules of compurgation. ' '32
Over time, trial by compurgation evolved into trial by jury.33
Rather than seeking out friends and relatives of the accused who
would swear to the accused's innocence, medieval court officials com-
manded twelve people to testify, based on personal knowledge, to the
27. PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE, 26 (1984); VA-
LERE P. HANs & NEIL VDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY, 24 (1986) [hereinafter JUDGING THE
JURY]. The number of individuals required may have been as many as thirty-six (if the
defendant had an especially bad reputation), although the usual number was twelve.
28. JUDGING THE JURY, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. The difficulties created by the compurgation procedure are recounted by Profes-
sors Hans and Vidmar: "sometimes, disputes were resolved on the basis of who got the
most compurgators. To make matters worse, bribery and other inducements to compurga-
tors were common." Id. at 25. But see R.H. Helmholz, Crime Compurgation and the
Courts of the Medieval Church, 1 LAW & HIsT. REv. 1, 17 (1983) (noting that the fairly
rigid requirements needed to qualify compurgators and arguing that the low conviction
rate of trial by compurgation was comparable to that of early jury trials).
31. JUDGING THE JURY, supra note 27, at 25-26.
32. Id.
33. The jury trial resulted from a century-long evolution in English law and custom.
THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON TnE ENG-
LISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800 at 4 (1985). Compurgation and its ancient contem-
porary, trial by ordeal, were supplemented after the Norman conquest by the institution of
the "appeal." Id. at 5. An appeal commenced when an injured party, or appellor, made a
public accusation of another-the appellee. Roger D. Groot, The Early-Thirteenth-Cen-
tury Criminal Jury, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN
ENGLAND, 1200-1800 at 3,4 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green, eds. 1988). Proof of an
appeal was made by duel or combat. Id. In 1166, the Assize of Clarendon instituted the
precursor of the modem grand jury as an accusatory procedure. GREEN, supra at 3. Com-
purgation was used sporatically after the Norman conquest, but it was not finally abolished
until 1833. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
mTrrrmENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 3 n.a (1977). There is much evidence to suggest
that many of the features of the jury trial were borrowed from its anglo-saxon predecessor.
See, e.g., LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 39 (2d
ed. 1988) (suggesting jury numbers twelve because this was the number traditionally used
for compurgation). For more detailed treatment of the evolution of compurgation into
trial by jury, see WrLLAm FoRSY h, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (2d ed. 1971) (originally
published 1878); Mfxims A. LESSER, THE HIsTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF m JURY SYS-
TEM (1894 & photo. reprint 1979); JOHN PROFFArr, A TREATISE ON TRAL BY JURY (1986)
(originally published 1877).
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facts or about the parties involved.3 Eventually, courts came to rely
on these "disinterested" juries for a judgment of guilt or innocence.'5
As the function of the jury changed, so too did notions of the
jury's representativeness. As Professors Hans and Vidmar point out:
Originally, when jurors were considered to be witnesses, it made
sense that they should be from the community in which the al-
leged incident took place. Only community residents would
have knowledge bearing on the case. As the jury developed into
a body of impartial fact-finders, community residence was no
longer so important. However, a new rationale developed. It
was argued that the jurors should be from the county in which
the incident took place so that the jury could express the opin-
ions of the community about a fair and proper verdict.
36
These interpretations of the jury's representative function crossed
the Atlantic with the colonizers of the New World.37 For American
colonists, the need for a representatively constituted jury was a con-
crete matter. One of the grievances specifically mentioned in the
Declaration of Independence was the English practice of transporting
34. JUDGING THE JURY supra note 27, at 26.
35. Id. at 27. The expansion of the role of the jury to include the evaluation of evi-
dence along with its traditional role of determining the veracity of witnesses was the final
step in the evolution from compurgation to trial by jury. Anthony Valen, Jurors Asking
Questions: Revolutionary or Evolutionary?, 20 N. Ky. L. Rv. 423, n.8 (1993). This transi-
tion, too, was a gradual one. FRANcIs H. HELLER, THE S=XTH AMENDMENT TO TH CON-
STiTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8 (1969)
originally published 1951). Bushnell's Case was one of the first to draw a clear distinction
between jurors and witnesses. Bushnell's Case, Vaughan, 135, 6 How. St. Tr. 999 (1670).
Chief Justice Vaughan's opinion underscored the jury's duty as evaluator of evidence by
requiring jurors with personal knowledge of the facts to offer their testimony as witnesses.
See Valen, supra. It was not until Lord Ellenborough held that a verdict could not be
sustained when it was based on a juror's own knowledge rather than evidence produced at
trial, however, that the jury's role as impartial judge of the facts was securely established.
See Rex v. Sutton, 34 Eng. Rep. 931, 934-35 (K.B. 1816); Valen, supra.
36. JUDGING TmE JURY, supra note 27, at 28-29.
37. By the time the American Colonies were established, jury trial in criminal cases
was considered one of the undeniable rights of Englishmen. HELLER, supra note 35 at 14.
Juries were empaneled in criminal cases in the colonies from the very beginning. Id. at 16.
It would be a mistake, however, to view the early American jury as a mere copy of the
English original. According to Heller:
[Tihe development of jury trial in America reflects the fact that there was first "a
period of rude, untechinal popular law," an attempt by laymen to order their
affairs by themselves in an atmosphere of pronounced hostility toward the legal
profession and their methods. The jury trial of colonial days is, therefore, not a
rigid copy of its English prototype but rather the result of variegated experiences,
experimentation, and adoption.
Id at 15 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Paul S. Reinsch, The English Common Law in the
Early American Colonies, 2 BULL. U. Wis. (1899)).
colonists accused of treason to England for trial." The colonists
viewed removal to England as an unwarranted infringement of their
right to jury trial.39 When an accused colonist was tried by the Crown
of England, he was depreived of "the benefit of being known by those
who prosecuted and tried him, the benefit of having his friends and
relatives close at hand to provide legal and moral support, and the
benefit of knowing the jurors and thereby being able to challenge ju-
rors intelligently."' The English abuses ultimately led to the adop-
tion of two constitutional provisions, both of which were viewed as
necessary to uphold the traditional notions of trial by jury. The con-
cern over requiring accused persons to be tried where they cannot
easily defend themselves, whether in England or another state, was
addressed by the venue provision of Article I1.41 The concern over
requiring accused persons to be tried before a group of strangers, who
knew little about the offense or the circumstances surrounding it, was
addressed by the Sixth Amendment's vicinage provision.42
The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury be selected from
"the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted. '43 In addition to the requirement that the jury be selected from
the locale in which the crime took place, the Supreme Court has held
that the jury selected must also be "representative" of that locale.44 In
order to fulfill the jury's representative function, the court has ex-
plained, the jury must be selected from a "fair cross section" of the
community.45
38. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 801, 807 (1976).
39. Id. at 806-07.
40. Ia- at 808.
41. L at 805-12. Article M of the Constitution provides that "[t]he trial of all Crimes
... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed." U.S.
CONsT. art. HI, § 2, cl. 3.
42. See Kershen, supra note 38, at 828-833.
43. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI. This is referred to as the "vicinage" requirement. See
Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918).
44. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("lilt is part of the established tradition in
the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community.").
45. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). The court first mentioned the consti-
tutional significance of insuring that juries were selected from a cross-section of the com-
munity in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (Sixth Amendment requires jury
selection process that "comport[s] with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the
community."). In Taylor, the Court held that although there is "no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community," a jury selection process that excluded
"large, distinctive groups" from the jury pool could not pass constitutional muster. Taylor,
419 U.S. at 530, 538.
Winter 19951 WHEN JURIES MEET THE PRESS
414 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:405
The fair cross section requirement is justified as a means of insur-
ing a representative jury. The Supreme Court has identified several
reasons why it is important for juries to be representative of the com-
munity at large. First, representative juries "make available the com-
monsense judgment of the community" to guard against the exercise
of arbitrary power by a prosecutor or judge.4 6 Second, representative
juries help build and maintain public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system.47 Third, representative juries enable a broad
section of the populace to share responsibility for the administration
of justice.48 Finally, the "broad representative character of the jury" is
desirable because it ensures that the jury's deliberations will be
marked by "a diffused impartiality. '49
The first (protection against state excesses) and second (public
confidence) justifications for the fair cross section requirement are re-
lated. Public confidence is maintained in the criminal justice system
because the jury has the power to shield the defendant from the ex-
cesses of the state. The second justification, public confidence, is also
related to the fourth justification, impartiality. The jury maintains
public confidence because it is impartial. Thus, central to the jury's
representativeness is its ability to confer legitimacy. The jury confers
legitimacy for two reasons. First, it is assumed that its broadly repre-
sentative character will protect a defendant against manipulative gov-
ernment tactics. Second, a representative jury will prevent any one
special interest group from gaining control of the deliberative process
and rendering a verdict based on bias or prejudice.
The jury's representative function, then, consists of two aspects:
the effect of the representative jury on fact-finding and the legitima-
tion of the criminal justice process. 50 The representative jury aids
fact-finding because "a jury composed of individuals with a wide
range of experiences, backgrounds, and knowledge is more likely to
perceive the facts from different perspectives and thus engage in a
vigorous and thorough debate. ' 51 In addition, the verdict of a repre-
sentative jury is considered less skewed by nonevidentiary considera-
46. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 530-31 (citation omitted). See also JUDGING T=E JURY, supra note 27, at 50.
50. Cf. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,606 (1982) (noting that
public access to trial similarly both intensifies "the quality and safeguards the integrity of
the factfinding process," and "fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public
respect for the judicial process").
51. JUDGING THE JURY, supra note 27, at 50.
tions. As Professors Hans and Vidmar explain: "The jury's
heterogenous makeup may also lessen the power of prejudice. Biases
for and against the defendant, if evenly distributed on the jury, may
cancel each other out."'52
Representative juries also further the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system. Juries in which a cross-section of the community is rep-
resented sanction their verdicts as the results of a democratic process.
Their verdicts are consequently imbued with greater validity. Juries
can either support or undermine the acceptability of the state's accu-
sations merely by the representativeness of their makeup. In sum:
"Regardless of whether or not the composition of the jury actually
makes a difference in any particular case, people look to the composi-
tion of the jury to explain verdicts. Thus, not only for fact-finding but
also for legitimation, a representative jury is desirable. '53
While there are many benefits to be gained from insuring that
jury composition is representative, there are some potential dangers
as well. First, there is an inherent tension between the desire to repre-
sent community views on juries and the need to ensure that external
views do not unduly influence the jury's deliberative processes. The
objective of the fair cross section requirement is for the jury to reflect
community thinking, or to process information in a manner like that
used by members of the community, without adopting pre-formed
community opinions about the issues under consideration. While ju-
ries are expected to be representative of the community, they are also
expected to be independent of the community. Thus, for the criminal
justice process to operate properly, an inherent contradiction must be
balanced-a representative jury must also be an unbiased jury.5 4
One way to manage the conflict between the quest for a represen-
tative jury and the desire for an unbiased one is to emphasize the in-
dependence of the jury and minimize the cost to jurors of exercising
their independent judgment. Thus, jurors are instructed that the opin-
ion they render must be their own, and that they must not discuss the
case with persons who are not on the jury.55 Efforts are made to pro-
tect the jury from outside influences, whether these arise before or
52. Id.
53. Id. at 51.
54. Commentators Wayne LaFave and Jerold Israel have observed that relying on the
voir dire process to remove potential jurors who harbor prejudicial bias against the defend-
ant "may also produce a side effect of a less representative jury when the voir dire can be
expected to result in the exclusion of a substantial proportion of the array." WAYNE
LAFAvE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.2, at 996 (2d ed. 1992).
55. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRaiNAL JURY INsTRucrIONS 4 (1988).
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during the jury's deliberations. Jurors are sought who have not prede-
termined the defendant's innocence or guilt, or who can at least act
impartially.5 6 In addition, jury tampering is treated as a serious of-
fense. 7 In notorious cases, the jury may even be sequestered,5" and
some courts have taken the controversial step of seating "anonymous"
juries.5 9 These efforts privilege the concept of the jury as an in-
dependent body-separate from the community-that should be pro-
tected from outside influences so its deliberations can proceed
untainted.60 This perspective is epitomized in Professor John Henry
Wigmore's observation that it is the obscurity of the average juror that
keeps the jury inaccessible to "the arts of corruption and chicanery.' 61
In Wigmore's view: "The grand solid merit of the jury trial is that the
jurors of fact are selected at the last moment from the multitude of
citizens. They cannot be known beforehand, and they melt back into
the multitude after each trial."62
56. Most jurisdictions have provisions that allow jurors to be challenged for cause
whenever it is demonstrated that a "juror has a state of mind ... which will prevent him
from acting with impartiality." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 54, § 22.3(c), at 844. But
this does not mean that a juror may be dismissed simply because he or she has heard
something about a case or has formed an opinion about it. As the Supreme Court noted in
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961):
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a
prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court.
57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1988) (providing criminal penalties for any attempt to
"influence, intimidate, or impede" jurors); N.Y. Penal Law § 215.25 (McKinney 1988)
(classifying jury tampering as class A misdemeanor); Cal. Pen. Code § 95 (West 1988) (pro-
viding criminal penalties for "corrupt[ ] attempts to influence a juror").
58. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (recommending se-
questration of jurors as alternative to exclusion of press from trial).
59. For a more in-depth discussion of anonymous juries, see discussion infra part
M(C).
60. As Professors LaFave and Israel explain:
For the defendant to have a fair trial, the jury should decide his case on the basis
of the evidence admitted at trial and not by considering other facts or allegations
appearing in the media or assertions in the media as to what the outcome of the
trial ought to be.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 22.1, at 885 (1985).
See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 369 (The right to fair trial may be adversely
affected when publicity has "influence[d] public opinion against a defendant."). See also
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
61. John H. Wigmore, To Ruin Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 19 ILL. L. REv. 97, 98
(1924).
62. Id. at 98.
While Wigmore's observation may still ring true in the majority
of cases, it is obvious that the media saturation of contemporary
American society has resulted in the appearance of a class of cases
where the jurors are anything but obscure. In 1995, juries in high pro-
file cases are the focus of public attention. These juries have a new
representative function-that of representing the criminal justice sys-
tem to those who did not serve. Section III attempts to discover the
practical justifications for the jury's new representative function. This
section therefore analyzes media attempts to gain access to juror iden-
tities, explicit media requests for post-trial interviews and attempts to
impanel anonymous juries.
111. Judicial Recognition of the Jury's New
Representative Function
A. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court's changing interpretation of the jury's repre-
sentative function can be seen in its opinions permitting greater media
access to events that take place in criminal courtrooms. In its early
decisions, the court was skeptical of the media's role in the criminal
justice process and careful to protect the jury from outside influences.
The Court, however, now views the media as a valuable public watch-
dog that provides an open and public view of the institutions of
justice.
The court's early attitude toward the interaction of the media
with the jury is typified in Irvin v. Dowd.63 In that case, decided in
1961, the Supreme Court took notice of the adverse impact that the
media could have on a defendant's chances for a fair trial.' The
court's opinion chronicled the negative media campaign and led it to
conclude that the jury impaneled to hear the defendant's case was not
impartial.65 The Court noticed that "a barrage of newspaper head-
lines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against" the de-
fendant and that "the force of this continued adverse publicity caused
a sustained excitement and fostered a strong prejudice" in the minds
of potential jurors.66 Yet, the Court suggested no procedures to insu-
63. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
64. Id. at 719-20.
65. Id. at 728.
66. Id. at 725-26.
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late prospective jurors from negative publicity or to keep the press
from publicizing potentially damaging information. 67
Only five years later did the Court attempt to provide any gui-
dance to courts on how to manage media publicity. In Sheppard v.
Maxwell,68 the Court insisted that trial courts "regulate[ ] the conduct
of newsmen in the courtroom. '69 Further, the Court suggested spe-
cific procedures that trial judges could employ to ensure that publicity
occasioned by the media did not threaten the fairness of the trial.70
The Sheppard Court stated that it was "unwilling to place any direct
limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news me-
dia"71 even though the court repeatedly emphasized the importance of
insuring that "the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences."72 The Court viewed the Sheppard jury's new
found "celebrity" status as a great tragedy. According to the Court:
[T]he jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by thejudge's failure to insulate them from reporters and photogra-
phers .... The numerous pictures of the jurors, with their ad-
dresses, which appeared in newspapers before and during the
trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion from both
cranks and friends. The fact that anonymous letters had been
received by prospective jurors should have made the judge
67. The majority opinion recited the facts of the case, but offered no analysis of the
role of the press. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter posed the following
question:
How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively
on what they heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their minds
were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter designed to
establish the guilt of the accused[?]
Id. at 729-30. Justice Frankfurter suggested that the First Amendment protections of the
media should not be interpreted to allow the press to interfere with the right of a defend-
ant to receive a fair trial. "The Court," he stated rhetorically, "has not yet decided that,
while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of
jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying
his trade." Id. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
68. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
69. Id. at 358. In the term before Sheppard was decided, the Supreme Court's concern
for courtroom decorum led it to banish television cameras from criminal trials. See Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Estes was later overturned by the court in Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560 (1981).
70. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 389. These included insulating witnesses from confronta-
tions with the press, controlling the release of information by participants in the trial, ad-
monishing jurors to avoid publicity about the case, changing venue, granting continuances,
and ordering the sequestration of the jury. Id. at 353, 363, 369.
71. Id. at 350.
72. Id. at 362.
aware that this publicity seriously threatened the jurors'
privacy.7
Therefore, the Court in Sheppard adopted a traditional view of
the jury's representative function. Rather than viewing the jury as an
institution that would benefit from greater public exposure, the Court
portrayed the jury as a body that must be protected from the excesses
of "a recalcitrant press."'74 From the Sheppard court's perspective,
the jury was expected to render its verdict in thoughtful isolation, in-
sulated from the passions and prejudices of public opinion.75
The Supreme Court's skepticism over the media's role in the
criminal justice system began to change in a series of decisions begin-
ning with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.76 In Richmond
Newspapers, a plurality of the Court recognized a First Amendment-
based public right of access to criminal proceedings for the first time. 7
Further, the Court agreed that "the media claim of functioning as sur-
rogates for the public" was valid because the media has the broad
ability to disseminate information about the criminal justice process.78
The plurality in Richmond Newspapers reasoned that open, pub-
lic trials were supported by both historical practice and logical deduc-
tion. After reviewing the history of the criminal trial in England and
the United States, the court concluded that "the very nature of a crim-
inal trial was its openness to those to attend. '79 The plurality opinion
listed three objective reasons why criminal trials should be opened,
focusing on the effect that the trial might have on the public rather
than on the effect the public might have on the trial. First, the plural-
ity opinion noted that open trials guarded against the oppression of
criminal defendants," and encouraged the public to acknowledge the
fairness of the criminal process.8 ' Second, the Court reasoned that
publicity engendered by criminal cases provides an outlet for public
outrage over crime. Therefore, public criminal trials reduce the possi-
73. Id. at 353.
74. Id. at 358.
75. See id. at 350-51.
76. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
77. The Sixth Amendment guarantees "the accused the right to a ... public trial," but
this personal right of the defendant was held to not apply to the general public. See Gan-
nett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 382.
78. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73 (Burger, Ci., plurality opinion).
79. Id. at 568 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
80. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (holding denial of public trial violates Due
Process).
81. There is a "nexus," stated the Court, "between openness, fairness, and the percep-
tion of fairness." 448 U.S. at 570 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
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bility of vigilantism where a community might take the law into its
own hands through bursts of anarchy or the formation of lynch mobs.
Consequently, public trials have a "significant community therapeutic
value. ' The Court observed that "[t]he crucial prophylactic aspects
of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no com-
munity catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a comer [or] in any
covert manner.' '8 3 Finally, the plurality asserted that the open crimi-
nal trial fulfilled a needed educational function by informing the pub-
lic about the workings of the criminal justice system.84
The court, in Richmond Newspapers, made it difficult for courts
to close criminal proceedings and exclude the press on the grounds
that such exclusion would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights to a public trial. Interestingly, though, the plurality claimed to
balance the newly recognized right of the public to attend trials
against the equally important right of the criminal defendant to re-
ceive a fair trial.8" In reality, the Plurality gave far greater deference
to the public right of access than it did to the defendant's right to a fair
trial. After Richmond Newspapers, a court must consider whether
there are any less restrictive means of ensuring the fairness of the trial
before closing a trial to the press.86 If the court does order closure,
then it must indicate why in specific, written findings. sY "Absent an
overriding interest articulated in findings," the plurality stated, "the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. '8
Relying on reasoning similar to that set forth in Richmond News-
papers, the Court quickly granted the media access to a variety of
criminal proceedings, including trials. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
rior Court8 9 (Press-Enterprise 1), for example, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the media's First Amendment right of access to voir dire
proceedings. In addition, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court9°
82. Id. at 570 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 571 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 572 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion).
85. See id. at 580-81 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
86. This requirement has turned out to be a fairly substantial hurdle for courts to
meet. Not only did "none of the Justices articulate[ ] the type of 'findings' which might
constitute an 'overriding interest' that would overcome the presumption of open trials,"
Lewis F. Weakland, Note, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and
Richmond Newspapers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 610 (1986),
but the Supreme Court has yet to determine in any of its subsequent decisions that any
reason would be sufficient to order closure of the trial.
87. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 581 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
89. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
90. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
(Press-Enterprise II), the Court permitted the media the right of ac-
cess to preliminary hearings. Finally, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court,91 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that
required courts to exclude the press from courtrooms during the testi-
mony of child victims of sexual assault. These cases solidified and ex-
panded the newly recognized public right of access to criminal trials,
and, in the process, set the stage for a transformation of the jury's
traditional representative function.
The decision in Press-Enterprise I, in particular, illustrates the
Supreme Court's willingness to reinterpret the jury's representative
role. In that case, the court held that voir dire cannot be closed to the
media unless "the presumption of openness [is] overcome.., by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'
The Court determined that the jury selection process, like the trial
itself, had been historically open to the public. In addition, the Court
stated that, under ordinary circumstances, voir dire should remain
open to the media so "that people not actually attending trials can
have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed."'93
Open jury selection procedures also inform the public "that offenders
are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly
and openly selected." 94 The Supreme Court's focus was therefore on
the decisionmaking process' effect on the public. Thus, while the
Court has not directly addressed the question of post-verdict inter-
views of jurors, it appears that the Court would interpret the jury's
representative function to emphasize its role as liaison to the commu-
nity-at-large.
The remaining parts of this section review lower court decisions
to determine how widely the jury's new representative function is ac-
cepted. One line of cases decided by lower courts, jury access cases,
seems to adopt and expand the Supreme Court's new version of the
jury's role. The role of the jury embraced in anonymous jury cases,
however, is not so clear. While juror anonymity would seem to make
information about the jury and its decision-making process harder to
come by, the seating of an anonymous jury is not entirely compatible
with the jury's new representative function.
91. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
92. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
93. Id. at 508.
94. Id. at 509.
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B. Jury Access Cases
In cases where the media has sought access to the names and ad-
dresses of jurors for the purpose of conducting post-verdict interviews,
lower courts have generally required the requested information to be
released. Lower courts tend to view greater media involvement in the
criminal justice system favorably. Among the values promoted by
post-trial media interviews are: (1) greater public confidence in the
criminal justice system; (2) increased public education about the crim-
inal trial process; and, (3) helping ensure the trial itself is fair.95 Even
though courts proclaim the public's right of access to criminal trials is
not absolute, relatively few courts will restrict media access to jurors
in favor of other competing rights, such as the jurors' right to privacy
or the defendant's right to a fair trial.
In In re Baltimore Sun Co.,96 for example, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals ordered the release of names and addresses of sit-
ting jurors, as well as members of the venire who were not chosen to
serve as jurors in a criminal prosecution arising out of a savings and
loan scandal. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Press Enter-
prise I, the Fourth Circuit decided that jury selection had been a his-
torically open process and that other alternatives, like change of
venue or sequestration, were available safeguards against possible
prejudice. Therefore, the court decided in favor of releasing juror
identities:
We recognize the difficulties which may exist in highly publi-
cized trials such as the case being tried here and the pressures
upon jurors. But we think the risk of loss of confidence of the
public in the judicial process is too great to permit a criminal
defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may maintain
anonymity.
97
The First Circuit also ordered the release of names and addresses
of jurors at the conclusion of a highly publicized trial. In In re Globe
Newspaper Co.,98 the Court of Appeals overturned the district court's
decision to withhold juror identities in a drug-related conspiracy case
involving several prominent defendants. 99 After the verdict was an-
nounced, the Boston Globe sought access to court records which con-
95. Cf. United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp 719,723 (D. Mass. 1987) (listing verifica-
tion of trial's fairness, public education and public confidence as reasons to permit post-
trial interviews). See text accompanying note 108-110, infra.
96. 841 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988).
97. Id. at 76.
98. 920 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990).
99. The district court judge questioned whether juror publicity would be beneficial.
His order denying access to the jury list stated:
tained names and addresses of jurors who had served in the trial. The
First Circuit held that a local federal district court rule required the
records in question be made available to the public.100 Although the
First Circuit did not reach the First Amendment issue, it determined
that the purposes served by media access to trials were "equally
served by access to the identities of the jurors."101 According to the
appeals court, publicizing juror identities allows the public to verify
the impartiality of the trial's key participants, ensuring fairness, the
appearance of fairness, and the promotion of public confidence in the
criminal justice system.' 2
In several cases, courts have directly addressed the question of
whether the media should be allowed to conduct post-trial interviews
with jurors. 0 3 One such case is United States v. Doherty.' 4 The dis-
trict court's opinion in Doherty is notable since it attempts to deli-
It is the judgment of the Court that interviews of jurors for the sole purpose of
exploiting the content of their deliberations, which have been conducted in secret
and in confidence with one another, tend to demean the administration of justice
in the public's view and to inhibit jurors, present and prospective, from voicing
their strongly held views for fear of subsequent public disclosure to the ultimate
detriment of the deliberative process.
Id. at 90 n.1.
100. The court rules made juror names and addresses available to the public, "unless
the presiding judge identifies specific, valid reasons necessitating confidentiality in the par-
ticular case." Id. at 91. The appeals court found that there were no reasons, such as threats
to the personal safety of jurors that would justify withholding the identities of the jurors.
The court also noted that "[a]fter the verdict, release normally would seem less likely to
harm the rights of the particular accuseds to a fair trial." Id.
101. Id. at 94.
102. According to the court of appeals:
It is possible, for example, that suspicions might arise in a particular trial (or in a
series of trials) that jurors were selected from only a narrow social group, or from
persons with certain political affiliations, or from persons associated with organ-
ized crime groups. It would be more difficult to inquire into such matters, and
those suspicions would seem in any event more real to the public, if names and
addresses were kept secret.
Id. at 94.
103. In United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a trial judge could not order the media to stay away from jurors after
the close of a trial. It was the appeals court's view that, since the trial had concluded, the
First Amendment did not compete with the defendant's right to a fair trial. Although the
trial court claimed its order was intended to protect the jurors from harassment and enable
them to serve in future trials, the court of appeals held that "[l]ess restrictive alternatives
are clearly available for each of these claimed threats." Id. at 1361. The court of appeals
suggested that any taint occasioned by a juror's interview with the press "could be discov-
ered on future voir dire and the juror excused." Id. Harassment, on the other hand, could
be dealt with when and if it occurs, since individual jurors "may not regard media inter-
views as harassing." Id. See also In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982)
(overturning order denying leave to interview jurors on First Amendment grounds); Jour-
nal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding trial court
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cately balance all the interests implicated by media interviews of
jurors following trial. Applying the history and logic tests adopted by
the Supreme Court in its media access cases, 10 5 the court in Doherty
decided to release the names and addresses of jurors to the media
after a one week delay. The court admitted that "the history of post-
verdict interviews appears scant,"'1  but concluded that courts have
interpreted the practice of post-verdict interviews in light of the
"broad latitude afforded the press in gathering news."'1 7 The court
also stated several logical reasons why post-verdict interviews of ju-
rors should be permitted. First, the court argued that the practice al-
lows the public to obtain "information about the actual people who do
render justice."'' 0 Second, post-verdict interviews provide for an "in-
dependent, non-governmental verification of the utter impartiality" of
the jury selection and deliberation processes. 0 9 Finally, the process
"educat[es] the public as to their own duties and obligations should
they be called for jury service."" 0
Unlike other courts that have decided to release juror identities
to the media, the court in Doherty considered whether the practice
might have an adverse impact on the criminal justice system. The
court stated:
Even though an accused's fair trial rights may diminish and ap-
pear to evaporate upon the reaching of the jury verdict, the ra-
tionale for juror secrecy during deliberations applies equally
well to secrecy post-verdict. For one juror to make public the
thoughts and deliberations of his or her colleagues in the delib-
eration room will "chill" the free flowing process that our sys-
tem encourages, especially if other jurors come to believe that it
is the accepted practice for jury deliberations to be freely dis-
cussed once the verdict is returned."'
The court stated that the "rights of the defendants.., are still
vitally implicated" even after the jury has reached a decision." 2 This
"could not issue a sweeping restraint forbidding all contact between the press and former
jurors without a compelling reason.").
104. 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987).
105. See, eg., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 555 (1980) (discussed at
text accompanying notes 76-88, supra).
106. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 722.
107. Id. The court shrewdly remarked that "the Courts of Appeals that have addressed
this issue have apparently accepted, sub silentio, that the public's right of access to jurors
after the verdict is returned is historically protected." Id. (footnotes omitted).
108. Id. at 723.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 724 (citations omitted).
112. Id.
WHEN JURIES MEET THE PRESS
finding, however, did not weigh in the court's ultimate decision to re-
lease juror identities. The jurors' right to privacy was of greatest con-
cern to the court. Indeed, it was this interest that the court balanced
against the media's right of access. In order to provide some protec-
tion to jurors, however, the court decided to delay the release of their
names and addresses until seven days after the return of the verdict.11 3
Not all lower courts have agreed to release juror names and ad-
dresses, even after Press-Enterprise I and 1I.14 In United States v. Ed-
wards,1 5 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
release the names and addresses of jurors who had been questioned in
two closed mid-trial hearings investigating potential jury misconduct,
even after the return of the verdict and discharge of the jury. At the
conclusion of the trial, representatives of three media organizations
sought transcripts of the closed proceedings. The trial judge released
the transcripts but redacted portions containing the names of jurors,
and "portions that if released would be unnecessarily embarrassing to
the jurors involved."" 6 The Fifth Circuit admitted that "the values of
openness are significantly implicated in jury misconduct matters, '11 7
yet the court declined to order the release of the withheld informa-
tion. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that greater harm could be done to
the jury as an institution if the names of suspected jurors were pro-
vided to the press, than if they remained under seal. The court noted
that reports of juror misconduct create distrust among jurors: "The
potentially divisive effects on relationships between jurors would be
exacerbated by a 'public hearing."'118 In addition, the court pointed
out that the process of uncovering juror misconduct may "create un-
113. Id. at 725.
114. Both the Delaware Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals have re-
fused to order the release of juror names and addresses so that the.media could conduct
interviews with jurors following the trial. See Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A2d 735 (Del.
1989) (holding fairness of the trial was adequately protected by the fact that the jurors
names were disclosed to the parties and the court and by the fact that the trial itself was
open to the public); Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 518 N.E.2d 930 (N.Y. 1987) (refusing to release
names and addresses of jurors under either New York statute or federal Constitution). The
Delaware Supreme Court took a particularly jaundiced view of the media's role as inter-
mediary between the public and the jury. In Gannett, the court stated that:
The courts, the State and the defendant have concurrent paramount concerns for,
and obligations to assure, a fair trial. This includes a proper solicitude for the jury
so that it is not subject to the extraneous influences of a media representative
which is also engaged in the business of selling newspapers.
571 A.2d at 750.
115. 823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1987).
116. Id. at 114 (internal quotations omitted).
117. Id. at 116.
118. Id. at 117.
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desirable bias against the defendants," especially if jurors are required
to "defend" themselves in open court.119
United States v. Harrelson,12 0 was another Fifth Circuit case that
restricted the media's ability to conduct post-trial interviews with ju-
rors. Harrelson involved the trial of three defendants charged with
conspiracy in connection with the murder of a federal district court
judge. 121 The trial court issued an order preventing media representa-
tives from making repeated requests for interviews with discharged
jurors. 22 In addition, the court's order prevented interviewers from
inquiring into "the specific vote of any juror other than the juror being
interviewed.""z While the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that media
representatives could not be completely barred from interviewing ex-
jurors, it upheld the trial court's order based on the jurors' right to
privacy and to protect the institutional integrity of the jury. The court
explained its decision to prevent the media from inquiring into jurors'
specific votes: "Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence
of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their argument,
and ballots were to be freely published to the world."'2
C. Anonymous Juries
The most extreme way to ensure that names and addresses of ju-
rors remain secret is through the use of an anonymous jury. When
anonymous juries are seated, the identities of the jurors are concealed
from the press and public, as well as the parties to the trial. Anony-
119. Id. The decision in Edwards may have been a result of the particular facts raised
in a case where members of the jury accuse other jury members of wrongdoing. In decid-
ing Edwards, however, the court followed an earlier Fifth Circuit case, United States v.
Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), in which no allegations of jury misconduct were at
issue. Relying heavily on language contained in the Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard,
the Gurney court refused to overturn the trial court's decision to not release jurors' names
and addresses. The court did not view its decision as a major infringement on the rights of
the press since the district court did not place any prior restraints on the media's news
gathering ability. Instead, the court characterized its decision as a "mere[ ] refus[al] to
allow the appellants to inspect documents not a matter of public record." Id. at 1208.
Gurney was decided before the Supreme Court determined that the First Amendment
guaranteed a public right of access to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers. The Ed-
wards court did not mention this fact in citing Gurney, suggesting that the Fifth Circuit
continues to believes that withholding juror identities from the media is constitutionally
permissible.
120. 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 1115.
122. Id. at 1116.
123. Id. at 1116.
124. Id. at 1118 (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)).
mous juries were first approved in United States v. Barnes.125 In
Barnes, jurors were identified by number throughout voir dire and the
trial. Anonymous juries are justified as a means of providing for the
safety of jurors and protecting the deliberation process from outside
influences.126 Thus, courts usually do not consider what effect, if any,
the concealment of juror identities will have on the jury's representa-
tive function in deciding whether to allow the selection of an anony-
mous jury. 27 In Barnes, however, the court expressly rejected the
argument that "jurors must publicly disclose their identities and pub-
licly take responsibility for the decisions they are to make."' 12
The concept of the anonymous jury appears to conflict with any
notion that juries must be open to public inquiry. Some anonymous
jury cases support this conclusion by treating extensive publicity as a
reason for keeping the identities of jurors secret. 12 9 The seating of an
anonymous jury, however, need not prevent public review of the
jury's verdict. Indeed, a court could both seat an anonymous jury and
encourage post-trial communication between the media and the jury,
as the trial court did in the Reginald Denny case. 3 0 Anonymous jury
cases tell us little about how courts typically view the proper role of
125. 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980). See also
United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376,392 (2d Cir. 1964) (suggesting, in dicta, use of anony-
mous jury as means of preventing jury tampering). Other cases approving of anonymous
juries include United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1132-33 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1081 (1990); United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985). See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir.
1988) (citing cases). See generally Eric Wertheim, Note, Anonymous Juries, 54 ForeHAM
L. REv. 981 (1986) (approving of use of anonymous juries in appropriate circumstances).
126. For example, Barnes involved the highly publicized trial of a purported drug over-
lord. The appeals court approved the district court's decision to seat an anonymous jury in
view of allegations of violence from the defendant's henchmen and the history of violence
in the district. 604 F.2d at 141. Given the massive publicity of violent acts associated with
the case, the trial court also wanted to make sure that jurors felt secure from harm even if
the actual potential of violence was slight. Id.
127. In United States v. Melendez, 743 F. Supp. 134, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), the court
identified the following three factors as reasons to impanel an anonymous jury:
(1) the seriousness of the offenses charged, including whether the defendants are
alleged to have engaged in dangerous and unscrupulous conduct in the context of
a large-scale criminal organization and whether the defendants have access to
means to harm jurors;
(2) whether the defendants have engaged in past attempts to interfere with the
workings of the judicial process, such as by jury tampering or attempts to evade
prosecution; and,
(3) the nature and degree of pretrial and expected trial publicity.
128. 604 F.2d at 140.
129. See, e.g., Melendez, 743 F. Supp at 137.
130. See Mydans, supra note 1.
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the jury131 because anonymous juries are normally seated only where
some compelling and extraordinary threat is present. In most criminal
trials-even highly publicized ones-anonymous juries will not be
empaneled. 32
D. Summary
There appears to be a trend toward increased judicial acceptance
of a new interpretation of the jury's representative role, even though
some lower courts remain skeptical. Formerly, courts viewed the jury
as a body that needed to be isolated from publicity and represent a
fair cross section of the community. Recently, courts have begun to
view juries as having additional representative burdens to fulfill once
the verdict has been returned. This new concept of the jury is espe-
cially evident in cases which have permitted media access to juror
names and addresses for the purpose of facilitating post-verdict inter-
views. In justifying post-trial interviews, courts routinely mention the
beneficial effects of allowing former jurors to communicate with the
general public through the media. These benefits include educating
others about the nature of jury service, explaining the reasons for the
decision reached in the case, and ensuring the community that the
outcome of the case was fair. These cases evidence a new judicial per-
spective on the appropriate role of the jury because the opinions
either do not address, or expressly reject, traditional arguments that
media influence will interfere with the deliberative process or other-
wise undermine the legitimacy of the verdict, or of the jury as an insti-
tution. Section IV examines the jury's new representative function
131. Cf. United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that juror
anonymity does not change the role that jurors play in criminal cases because, ordinarily,
"[t]he lack of continuity in their service tends to insulate jurors from recrimination"). In
Scarfo, the court stated:
Because the system contemplates that jurors will inconspicuously fade back into
the community once their tenure is completed, anonymity would seem entirely
consistent with, rather than anathema to, the jury concept.
Id.
132. Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the Sixth
Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media and the Privacy
Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PioBs. 371, 397-98 (1992) ("use of an anonymous
jury is an extraordinary solution that is only justified in extreme circumstances"). See
United States v. Melendez, 743 F. Supp. 134, 137 (discussed supra at note 127) and Wer-
theim, Anonymous Juries, supra note 125, at 1001-002 (arguing that anonymous juries
should be restricted to cases where: (1) defendant has engaged in dangerous conduct espe-
cially in connection with organized crime; (2) defendant has made past attempts to inter-
fere with criminal justice; and (3) case is subject of extensive pre-trial publicity).
more closely and investigates its effect on the jury's traditional role in
the criminal justice process.
IV. The Jury's New Representative Function
The jury's new representative function is defined by the desire of
juries in high proffle cases to defend its verdict in the arena of of pub-
lic opinion. The jury must now be representative to instead of merely
representative of the community. Clearly, this novel interpretation of
jury representativeness cannot be explained by the same terms that
describe traditional views of the jury's representative function. Fur-
thermore, the need for juries to explain their verdicts may work
against the interests that are served by providing a fair cross section of
the community on the jury pool. This section analyzes how the jury's
new and different representative function affects the fact-finding, le-
gitimating, and educational roles that the jury is expected to play
within the criminal justice system.
A. Fact-Finding
The central function of a jury within the criminal justice system is
that of a fact-finder. The selection of a jury that is representative of
the community is promoted, in part, because it furthers the fact-find-
ing process.133 Divining the effect of the jury's new representative
function on fact-finding, however, is much more complicated. Argua-
bly, subjecting jury verdicts to public review may enhance the fact-
finding process because jurors will be required to defend their deci-
sions at the close of trial. In theory, this imperative could motivate
jurors to take their responsibilities more seriously and review the evi-
dence more carefully. On the other hand, community oversight-if it
were to have any effect on the decision-making process at all-may
encourage jurors to decide the facts of a case in anticipation of ex-
pected community pressure. That is, jurors may reach their verdicts
based on how they would expect their findings to play to media audi-
ences.13 4 Thus, jurors may be tempted to give less consideration,
rather than more, to the evidence in a particular case.
133. A jury that is representative in the traditional sense may be able to lessen any
prejudices jurors may have and draw upon the varied experiences of diverse jurors to en-
hance its fact-finding ability. See text accompanying notes 50-51, supra.
134. The concern over whether the verdicts in the Denny case were reached merely to
avoid a violent public reaction provides one of the more extreme examples of this problem.
See Jim Newton, L.A. Trials Show "Blind Justice" Hard to Achieve, supra, note 18.
Winter 19951 WHEN JURIES MIEET THE PRESS
430 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:405
The negative impact of community pressure on juries is not
merely speculative. In Sheppard v. Maxwell,135 the Supreme Court
held that the defendant was denied due process because he had been
tried before a jury that was heavily influenced by "massive, pervasive
and prejudicial publicity. ' 136 In Sheppard, the names and addresses of
prospective jurors were published in the local papers and, as a result,
all of them received anonymous letters and telephone calls expressing
opinions about the case.137 The Court overturned the defendant's
conviction, holding that "[d]ue process requires that the accused re-
ceive a trial... free from outside influences.' 38 The Court empha-
sized the importance of jury independence. "[N]o one," the Court
stated, should "be punished for a crime without a charge fairly made
and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excite-
ment, and tyrannical power.' 1 3 9 The Court also stressed that too
much is at stake in criminal cases to allow the outcome of the trial to
depend entirely on the arts of persuasion; "legal trials are not.., to be
won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspa-
per."' Thus, Sheppard suggests that while community input is de-
sired, direct democracy should not be embraced as a means of
resolving criminal matters.
Sheppard addresses the negative effects of community influence
on jurors before or during trial. Wiley v. State,'141 a Georgia death
135. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
136. Id. at 335. The court recounted the facts of the case as follows:
The jurors... were constantly exposed to the news media. Every juror, except
one, testified at voir dire to reading about the case in the Cleveland newspapers
or to having heard broadcasts about it. . . . As the selection of the jury
progressed, individual pictures of prospective members appeared daily. During
the trial, pictures of the jury appeared over 40 times in the Cleveland papers
alone. The Court permitted photographers to take pictures of the jury in the box,
and individual pictures of the members in the jury room. One newspaper ran
pictures of the jurors... when they went.., to view the scene of the murder.
Another paper featured the home life of an alternate juror. The day before the
verdict was rendered ... the jury was separated into two groups to pose for pho-
tographs which appeared in the newspapers.
Id. at 345.
137. Id. at 342. A year before Sheppard was decided, the Supreme Court commented
on the need to protect the jury from outside influence. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
In Estes, the Supreme Court forbade the televising of a criminal trial. (This holding was
later overturned by Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981)). The court recognized that
"[p]retrial [publicity] can create a major problem for the defendant in a criminal case,"
because it can "set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence." Estes, 381 U.S. at 536.
138. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362.
139. Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. 296 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 1982).
penalty case, illustrates the danger of revealing jurors' identities to the
public after the trial has concluded. In Wiley, the jury had returned a
guilty verdict but had deadlocked on the question of whether to im-
pose the death penalty. The judge identified the lone holdout in open
court prior to dismissing the jury. The juror was strongly reproached
by the prosecutor and the juror's identity was subsequently published
in the press. According to published accounts, "[a]fter the trial this
juror had acid thrown into his locker at work and received several
death threats over the phone."'142
Exposing the jury to public attention creates a risk that jurors will
render decisions based on community desires and not the facts of the
case in order to avoid public vilification. Public review of jury verdicts
may raise few concerns where the community is aware of all of the
circumstances of the case and harbors no unfair prejudices against the
defendant. In cases where such prerequisites are not met, however,
great injustice can be done if the jury is required to defend its verdict
through the media. Personal experience and sociological inquiry indi-
cate that normative social influence can cause "people [to] conform
because they fear the negative consequences of appearing deviant."' 43
Psychologists determined many years ago that "jurors are better able
to resist normative pressure when their judgments are made anony-
mously."'1  When jurors are aware that they will be thrust into the
public eye at the end of their service, there is a great danger that their
ability to exercise their own independent judgment may be affected.' 45
142. D. Ranii, Judge is Criticized for Identifying Holdout Juror, NAT'L. L. J. 2,14, (Jan.
4, 1982), discussed in SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WrIGrrmAN, THE Am:EnicAN
JURY ON TRIAL: PsYCHOLOGIcAL PERsPEcrrVEs 191 (1988).
143. KAssiN & WRIGHSMAN, supra note 142, at 175. The fear is justifiable since
"[d]ecision-making groups often reject, ridicule, and punish individuals who frustrate a
common goal by adhering to a deviant position." Id.
144. Id. at 191. See also SOLOMON E. AscH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952) (study showed
subjects knowingly answered test questions incorrectly in order to conform to majority
position); Morton Deutsch & Harold B. Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational
Social Influence upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. AnNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 629 (1955)
(subjects who answered test questions anonymously less likely to follow incorrect
majority).
145. As Justice Cardozo warned in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933),
"[flreedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were
made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world."
The court in United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987), makes the same
point. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 6, at 890-91
("A juror who realizes, consciously or subconsciously, that deliberations may become a
part of the public domain is less likely to argue for judgments contrary to public opinion,
and the deliberative process is therefore less likely to produce them.").
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In addition, jurors that expect their fellow jurors to report the
substance of their deliberations to the press may not be as open and
honest as they might otherwise be. This could also skew the outcome
of a case. For example, if a juror were to express racial prejudice in
arguing for a conviction,"4 other jurors might be able to convince the
juror to keep an open mind. At the very least, the other jurors can
discount the prejudiced juror's opinion as they formulate their own. If
it is likely that the jurors will be discussiing their deliberations with
the press after the trial, however, the first juror might be less forth-
coming about his prejudices. The opportunity to persuade him to
open his mind would be lost, and the risk that his opinion would be
overvalued by others would be increased. 47
The potential "chilling" effect of public disclosure on jury deliber-
ations is one of the justifications for the common law rule prohibiting
the admission of juror testimony to impeach jury verdicts.148 As the
Supreme Court explained in McDonald v. Pless,49 permitting jurors
to testify about the conduct of their discussions would "make what
was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of pub-
lic investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference. ' 150  Several states' 51 and the federal
146. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Shillcut, 350 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Wis. 1984) (A juror in solicita-
tion case reportedly remarked, "let's be logical, he is black, and he sees a seventeen year-
old white girl-I know the type.").
147. I am indebted to my colleague, Michael Seigel, for providing me with this
illustration.
148. See Susan Crump, Jury Misconduc=4 Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 66 N.C. L. REv. 509, 513-17 (1988). The common law rule, dating from the 1785
English case of Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng.Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785), prohibits admission of juror
testimony to impeach a jury verdict unless the deliberation process has been contaminated
by an "extraneous influence." 8 JomH H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352, at 696-97 and
§ 2354, at 716 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
149. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
150. Id. at 267-68. See also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933); Rakes v.
United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1948) cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948); ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 15-4.7 (1980).
151. Fifteen states (Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin and
Wyoming) have evidentiary rules, patterned after the federal rule, prohibiting juror testi-
mony, except as to "extraneous prejudicial information" or "outside influences." See De-
velopments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. Rnv. 1472, 1595 n.3
(1988). Other jurisdictions prohibit juror testimony only as to matters that "inhere in the
verdict" (the "Iowa rule"), or permit juror testimony only when there is competent evi-
dence of misconduct from a source other than the juror (the "aliunde rule"), when the
misconduct is that of a third party other than the juror, or if the misconduct occurred
outside the jury room. See generally LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 54, at 1048-49.
courts'5 2 have adapted the common law position in evidentiary rules
which also restrict the use of juror testimony for impeachment pur-
poses. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 53 which adopts the common
law rule generally prohibiting juror testimony of misconduct, was fa-
vorably reviewed by the Supreme Court in Tanner v. United States."5 4
In Tanner, the Court held that Rule 606(b) could be properly invoked
to bar juror testimony about drug and alcohol use by several jurors
during the defendants' trial. The Court cited "the weighty govern-
ment interest in insulating the jury's deliberative process" as a basis
for its decision.'5 5 According to the Court, "full and frank discussion
in the jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict,
and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of
laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scru-
tiny of juror conduct. '15 6
The jury's fact-finding role may also be adversely affected where
jurors are tempted to return verdicts that would enhance their ability
to gain fame or fortune. Under this scenario, jurors would focus their
attention on what they might be able to reveal to media representa-
tives rather than concentrating on the evidence before them. 57 At
best, this focus on achieving pecuniary gain or celebrity status might
result in cases where jurors do not give their best efforts to their fact-
finding responsibilities. At worst, this would result in verdicts that are
intentionally skewed for monetary or publicity-seeking reasons. 58
152. See FED. R. EviD. 606(b).
153. Rule 606(b) provides in part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not tes-
tify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's delib-
erations ... except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
FED. R. Evn. 606(b).
154. 482 U.S. 107 (1987).
155. aid at 120.
156. Id at 120-21.
157. See Maura Dolan, Impartial Jurors Can Be Found, Court Experts Say, L.A. Tdnvs,
Jul. 9, 1994, at Al (noting reports that some prospective jurors in the King and Denny
cases admitted they had considered the possibility of making money from serving on jury
and that one prospective juror had thought about keeping a diary to later sell as a book).
Possibilities also exist for former jurors in high-profile cases to gain monetarily. See Jesse
Katz, Participants in King Case Try to Cash In, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at Al (foreper-
son of federal King trial received money to appear on Inside Edition, while foreperson of
state trial was working on a book).
158. See Note, Juror Journalism. Are Profit Motives Replacing Civic Duty?, 16 PEPP. L.
RFv. 329 (1989); Bennett H. Beach, The Juror as Celebrity, TI, Aug. 16, 1982, at 42.
Chiefly in response to fears that jurors might shirk their responsibilities in the quest for
profit, California has recently passed legislation making it a misdemeanor offense for ju-
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The desire for fame may also corrupt the fact-finding process in
less direct ways. If jurors in high-profile cases repeatedly appear on
television and in print, then jury service in those types of cases may
become more attractive to potential jurors interested in fame and less
attractive to potential jurors that desire anonymity. Therefore, each
type of juror may consciously seek inclusion or exclusion from jury
service depending on the potential publicity of the case. Such con-
scious exclusion or inclusion will ultimately result in a jury that does
not fairly represent the community."5 9 Further, a less representative
jury may turn out to be a less accurate finder of fact, for reasons that I
have already discussed.' 60
B. Legitimation
Allowing jurors to explain their decisions to the community at
large improves the jury's ability to legitimize its verdicts. Certainly,
subjecting jury findings to public review would enhance public confi-
dence in the results of jury trials. If the jury was isolated from public
scrutiny, then members of the community might reasonably fear that
juries would have the opportunity to work injustice.1 6' Indeed, the
more public the workings of a jury are, the more likely the community
will allow the jury to fulfill its role as an arbiter of disputes and accept
jury conclusions.
rors to accept compensation related to their service on a case until ninety days after being
discharged. Carl Ingram, Legislation Inspired by Simpson Case Signed, L.A. Tiwss, Sep.
27, 1994, at A21.
159. Of course this effect may not be significant when compared to the unrepresenta-
tiveness of juries that results from the exclusion of racial minorities from jury pools, the
exclusion of venire persons who have been exposed to prejudicial publicity, or the practical
exclusion of jurors with family or work conflicts. As a result, the juries that wind up hear-
ing some criminal cases are decidedly unlike everyone else.
160. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
161. The Supreme Court characterized the secret trial, as exemplified by such institu-
tions as the Spanish Inquisition, the English Court of Star Chamber, and the French mon-
archy's lettre de cachet, as a "menace to liberty." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,268-269 (1948).
These examples show that "[fln the hands of despotic groups... [the trial can] become an
instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of
the right of an accused to a fair trial." Id. at 269-270. But an open and public trial could
prevent such abuse. As Justice Hugo Black wrote:
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to the accused that his trial be conducted
in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of perse-
cution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous
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Juries in criminal cases do more than merely determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. Jury verdicts also "grant or withhold so-
cial approbation for defendants' behavior."'162 This "quasi-legislative"
function 16 is exercised by juries in many instances. As one author
explains:
Through its verdict, the jury engages in subtle policy-making on
issues as diverse as the point beyond which the government may
not step in inducing the commission of a crime, the limits of self-
defense, the boundaries of the defense of insanity, and the per-
missibility of certain types of protest against governmentpoliciesY164
Presumably, the jury's policy-making procedures should be disclosed
to the public so that these decisions acquire legitimacy. Arguably,
then, "[p]ost-verdict interviews ... play an essential role in the public
debate of issues critically germane to the criminal process and.., to
our government as a whole.' 16
5
Traditionally, however, jury verdicts were deemed legitimate pre-
cisely because they were rendered by an independent body and not
subject to the influence of popular opinion.'66 According to this point
of view, requiring jurors to explain their verdicts to the general public
gives jury verdicts less legitimacy, not more. The legitimacy of jury
verdicts, however, is generated from the grass-roots of society.' 67
162. Nunn, supra note 19, at 65.
163. See Raskopf, supra note 6, at 373.
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 374.
166. See VAN DYKE, supra note 33, at 47 ("We can safely say by 'impartial' our coun-
try's founders meant at least a jury that was not biased in favor of the prosecution, a jury
independent of outside influence, a jury that was-as far as could be ensured-fair.").
167. For state power to succed, the citizenry must be persuaded to acquiesce in its exer-
cise. See JURGEN HAERMAS, COMMUNICATION A THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 199 (T.
McCarthy, trans. 1979) ("I[T]he legitimacy of an order of domination is measured against
the belief in its legitimacy on the part of those subject to domination."); Robert W.
Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIOUE 281, 285-86 (David Kairys ed. 1986) ("[I]n order to be bearable to those who
suffer most from it, law must be perceived to be approximately just."). The notion that
ordinary citizens have some influence on the rules that govern them (and in this case, on
the acceptability of jury verdicts) is central to anti-instrumentalist accounts of the dynamics
of power. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWEn/KNOWlEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEwS AND
OTIER WRITINGS 1972-1977 at 98 (1980) (describing manifestation of power as an interac-
tive process in which "individuals ... are always in the position of simultaneously undergo-
ing and exercising . . power"); William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Serat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1447, 1447-448 (1992) ("IT]he view that social relations are constructed and power is
exercised through complex processes of negotiations is now widely shared.").
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Neither the state nor elite authorities168 can dictate what the commu-
nity will ultimately accept as legitimate. Jury verdicts must therefore
be in accord with popular notions of fairness and justice in order for
them to be successfully defended in the arena of public opinion. In
this sense, public review augments the legitimacy afforded jury ver-
dicts. The legitimacy bestowed upon the verdict by public review de-
rives from the community determination that the verdict was correct.
The increasing occurrence of post-trial juror interviews may mean
that the theory linking the legitimacy of the verdict to jury autonomy
lacks validity.169 In the eyes of the general public, the possibility that
its influence might warp the truth-finding function of the jury may not
be sufficient to diminish the legitimacy of jury verdicts that have been
subjected to public review. Thus, verdicts that have been explained to
the public may gain more legitimacy than those not discussed in the
media.
C. Education
The jury's traditional representative function was to educate the
public by exposing citizens to the workings of the criminal justice sys-
tem first hand. In other words, jury service functions as a democratic
process, directly involving community members in the criminal justice
system. Media attention to former jurors is also educational. The
comments of former jurors may better explain the jury deliberation
process. In this way, members of the public might be better informed
"as to their own duties and obligations should they be called for jury
service. '17° In addition, public review of jury trials could provide in-
sight into how a particular jury reached a particular decision. For ex-
ample, post-trial interviews could reveal whether the jury found
certain witnesses to be credible, whether the jury was influenced or
felt constrained by the judge's instructions, and whether the strategies
employed by the defense or prosecution were effective. Such infor-
168. By "elite authorities" I mean government officials, corporate managers, opinion
leaders and other wielders of institutional power and prestige. Cf. STUART HALL, CHAS
CRrrcHER, TONY JEFFERSON, JOHN CLARKE & BRIAN ROBERTS, POLICING THE CRISIS:
MUGGING, T-E STATE AND LAW AND ORDER 58 (1978) (referring to same as "primary
defenders" in a semiotic process that works to produce meaning).
169. Certainly in the Rodney King case, the independence of the jury did little to en-
hance the legitimacy of the verdict. But the verdict in that case may have lacked legitimacy
in the first place because the jury was not representative of the community in which the
crime took place. If the jury had been more representative, then it is possible that the
verdict may have been more readily accepted. It is not likely that riots would have broken
out in Los Angeles and other cities if an all-black jury had returned the not-guilty verdicts.
170. United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Mass. 1987).
mation not only educates the public as to the importance of jury ser-
vice and the complexity of the deliberation process, but also provides
invaluable insight to legal reformers and trial practitioners. 171
For example, juror comments following the first Rodney King
trial revealed that one of the two minority jurors did not initially agree
that the appropriate verdict should be not guilty.1 72 This juror then
changed her vote in the face of pressure from the other jurors. 173 This
revelation verified social science findings about jury dynamics' 74 and
underscored the importance of insuring that sufficient numbers of mi-
nority jurors were seated in the second trial.
Negative lessons, however, may be learned from juror's post-trial
appearances in the media. The dissection of jury verdicts by the popu-
lar media may encourage the "second guessing" of jury findings. Such
questioning of jury decisions may ultimately reduce respect for jury
verdicts and contribute to the decline of the dignity of the criminal
justice system.175 In addition, the sight of former jurors defending
their verdicts may teach prospective jurors that jury independence is,
171. However, the value of post-trial juror interviews as a window into the internal
functioning of the jury depends entirely on how accurate the information related by the
jurors is. As any student of human nature can confirm, "what people say about their own
behavior can be very unreliable." KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 142, at 16. People
can forget or have their own motivations for not telling the truth. Id. Psychologists and
jury researchers Saul Kassin and Lawrence Wrightsman question the ability of jurors to
correctly relate the events that occurred during their deliberations. Kassin and Wrights-
man point out that "[pirobably few people can accurately recall what counterarguments
were raised, by whom, and what effect they had on the group." Id.
172. Nina Bernstein, Bitter Division in Jury Room, NEwSDAY, May 14, 1992, at 5. The
juror, identified as Virginia Bravo Loya in press reports, "complained several times during
the deliberations of feeling pressured to give in to the majority." Id. After the verdict, she
spoke to reporters about the other jurors. She said, "it's like they wanted to see what they
wanted to see." Id.
173. Id
174. Several jury studies have shown that at least three minority jurors are required to
withstand the pressure of a nine-person racial majority on a jury. See HARRY KALvEN, JR.
& HANs ZEISEL, TnE AMERICAN JURY 463 (Phoenix ed., Univ. of Chicago 1976);
MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDicrs 16-18 (1977); S. E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure
upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in GRouP DYNAMICs 151, 152-155
(Dorwin Cartwright et al. eds., 1953); Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury
Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 748 (1959); Rita Simon & Prentice Marshall, The Jury Sys-
tem, in Ti RIGHTs OF Tm ACCUSED 211, 227 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1972). See generally
Sheri Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MiCH. L. Rnv. 1611, 1698-99 (1985)
(arguing for inclusion of at least three minority jurors on 14th Amendment grounds);
Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge" Thirteenth Amendment As a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CoRNEru L. Rav. 1, 113-15 (1990)
(arguing for inclusion of at least three black jurors in trials of black defendants on 13th
Amendment grounds).
175. Note, supra note 6, at 891.
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at best, a myth and that decisions should be tailored to match public
expectations.
The conflict between the positive and the negative educational
effects of post-trial interviews is intensified in the high-profile case. In
the highly publicized case, there may be a greater need to eductae the
public as to the reasons for the decision in order to prevent broad
dissatisfaction with the verdict. But increased public interest in a case
may also signal the presence of strong community feelings regarding
the defendant's guilt or innocence. If so, then greater publicity would
only underscore the risks that serving in these types of cases entail,
thereby encouraging potential jurors to shirk their responsibilities if
selected. The possibility that the jury's new representative function
will have a chilling effect on potential jurors seems more likely-and
more troubling-than the risk that jurors would fail to learn the na-
ture of their obligations in the absence of post-trial interviews.
D. Summary
Recognizing a new representative function for juries entails both
benefits and costs. The fact-finding ability of the jury, in particular,
may be affected when juries are subjected to post-verdict public scru-
tiny. Jurors may be encouraged to decide a case out of fear or intimi-
dation, or simply from the psychological need for public acceptance.
Furthermore, promoting post-trial communication with jurors may
tempt them to decide cases out of a desire for money or fame. The
fact-finding ability of the jury may also be skewed as publicity-shy po-
tential jurors exclude themselves from jury service.
Conversely, submitting jury verdicts for public review may en-
hance their legitimacy. While the traditional theory holds that the
jury's independence from public pressure gives verdicts their legiti-
macy, the public may be more likely to accept a verdict that is ex-
plained to them.
Finally, a new representative role for the jury may be justified on
the ground that it furthers public education. The public can learn of
the reasons for a jury's decision and of the nature of a juror's responsi-
bilities from the post-trial interviews. Potential jurors, however, can
also learn of the adverse consequences that may flow from not con-
forming to the public's viewpoint in a case.
Conclusion
Within the past two decades, perceptions of the jury and the na-
ture of its role in the criminal justice system have slowly changed. As
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the power and influence of the Fourth Estate has grown and ex-
panded, the relationship of the institutions of criminal justice to the
media have transformed. The jury, once considered a retreat where
jurors could ponder the weighty questions in seclusion, has become an
object of public attention and debate. Through the use of post-verdict
interviews with jurors, the media has shed light on the process of jury
deliberation. In high profile cases, the public may now anticipate an
announcement of the verdict, as well as an explanation of it.
Courts have fostered the transformation of the role of the jury
through decisions allowing greater media access to jurors following
trial. Courts generally speak favorably of the benefits that flow from
keeping the public informed about how the jury functions. These ben-
efits, however, are typically discussed in the context of a clash of rights
between the First Amendment protections of the press and, either the
privacy rights of jurors, or the defendant's right to a fair trial. By ap-
proaching the issue in this fashion, courts have failed to fully consider
how the changing role of the jury might impact the criminal justice
system as a whole.
Courts correctly conclude that allowing juries to explain and de-
fend their verdicts through the media may enhance the legitimacy of
jury verdicts and better educate the public. As this Article demon-
strates, however, the process courts assume will afford greater legiti-
macy to jury verdict, also works to undermine the jury's value as a
fact-finding instrument. While public opinion may reasonably be
courted to ensure that jury verdicts are accepted, public opinion can-
not be permitted to influence the outcome of trials. This tension, of
course, is inherent in the nature of the jury itself. The jury has always
operated as a popular democratic check on special interests that may
be represented by the prosecutor, the judge, or the defendant in a
criminal trial.176 Through the participation of former jurors in inter-
views with the media, the jury has unquestionably become more open
and more democratic. In the process, however, it has also become
more susceptible to the passions and politics that invariably infuse
public life.
176. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Alloca-
tion of Judicial Power, 56 Tx. L. Rv. 47, 58-59 (1977) (discussing democratizing effect of
juries).
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